Ghosts From MuddyWater

State-sponsored cyber warfare operations achieved their highest point in 2025 because this year combined escalating global tensions with new operational approaches and technological progress of involved parties. MuddyWater stands as the most prominent example of this transformation because it operates under various names including Static Kitten and TA450 and Mango Sandstorm within the fragmented Iranian cyber environment. The global intelligence community used to view MuddyWater as a "noisy" operation which sent large amounts of basic phishing messages through brute-force attacks while using simple scripting tools. The group has transformed into a top espionage tool which conducts sophisticated multi-phase cyber attacks that match the timing of military operations.

MuddyWater operated under the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) which maintained separate operations from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) cyber commands that operated publicly. The group conducted traditional operations for intelligence collection and surveillance activities throughout the Middle East region. The 2025 geopolitical crisis between Israel and Iran through their "12-Day War" military conflict forced the group to develop their operational doctrine and tradecraft and strategic objectives at an accelerated pace. The group needed to support high-intensity state-on-state warfare so they acquired sophisticated capabilities which included hardware vulnerability exploitation and software supply chain attacks through malvertising and massive internal communication channel exploitation. The research performs a forensic analysis of MuddyWater operations from 2025 by combining threat intelligence data with incident response records and geopolitical information to demonstrate how the group transitioned from a regional threat into a global strategic force that executes cyber espionage operations and physical military attacks.

The Operational Mandate: MOIS and the Blurring of Lines

The analysis of MuddyWater development needs to examine its position within Iran's dual security system framework. The IRGC operates as the main focus of public interest because it executes disruptive cyber attacks which include wiper attacks and critical infrastructure sabotage. The MOIS operates as the main foreign intelligence service of the regime which focuses on conducting permanent espionage operations and maintaining regime stability and tracking dissident activities. MuddyWater operates as an MOIS asset which follows a pattern of maintaining continuous system access to steal data instead of causing immediate system damage.

The 2025 Israeli conflict established an emergency situation which completely dismantled all existing institutional frameworks. The MOIS needed to back military goals which forced them to create a hybrid operational system. MuddyWater established access points in energy and telecommunications sectors for intelligence collection and to create conditions for disruptive or destructive actions which other Iranian units could execute through its access brokerage services. The military doctrine has undergone a fundamental change because it now combines traditional intelligence gathering (MOIS) with the operational strike capabilities needed for contemporary kinetic military operations.

The Crucible of June 2025: Cyber Operations in the "12-Day War"

The direct military clashes between Israel and Iran during mid-June became the main factor which drove MuddyWater to increase its operational speed and develop new tactical methods. The conflict provided a real-world setting to test new military technology while military forces needed to execute swift and powerful operations.

Timeline of Kinetic Escalation and Cyber Correlation

The conflict evolved from its initial state as a hidden "shadow war" into direct military confrontation. The Israeli military initiated "Operation Start" through its first airstrike against Iranian nuclear facilities and military bases which occurred on June 13. Iran launched a ballistic missile attack which targeted the Soroka Medical Center at Beersheba on June 19. The United States initiated "Operation Midnight Hammer" on June 22 to conduct direct attacks against Iranian facilities which operated from underground locations. The conflict reached its peak when both sides launched attacks against command centers until a short-lived ceasefire took effect on June 24.

MuddyWater's activities directly followed the sequence of events in this kinetic timeline. The group performed complete reconnaissance and network configuration from January to May 2025 before the outbreak of conflict. The group hacked servers to display Jerusalem CCTV footage in real-time beginning on June 17. The active conflict phase saw attackers launch a large-scale spear-phishing operation which focused on more than 100 government and diplomatic organizations across the MENA region to steal information about ceasefire talks and Western military assistance. The group dedicated itself to entrenchment after the conflict ended while it kept fighting for essential infrastructure and grew its European economic operations to create economic pressure through asymmetric means.

The "Tit-for-Tat" Doctrine in Cyberspace

The 2025 data shows that Iranian cyber strategy uses defensive methods which include performing counterattacks. Every major kinetic event had a corresponding cyber-response. The U.S. bunker-buster strikes triggered MuddyWater to launch an immediate surge of attacks against U.S. research organizations that focused on nuclear policy and Middle Eastern affairs. The defensive team needs to understand the regular pattern because it shows that a kinetic strike against Iran will lead to immediate phishing and exploitation attacks against organizations that support the attacking nation.

Deep Dive: Analysis of Signature 2025 Campaigns

MuddyWater launched three distinct operations which proved their capabilities exceeded their previous known operational boundaries.

Operation TamperedChef: The Psychology of Patience

The campaign operated from June until September 2025 to demonstrate exceptional capabilities in user trust exploitation and security vulnerability exploitation through malvertising attacks. The group acquired Google Ads for "free PDF editors" search terms to direct users toward a fake website for "AppSuite PDF Editor" which appeared professional.

The platform introduced a 56-day period which blocked user access to the platform. The software functioned as a working PDF editor during its first two months after deployment. The scheduled extended period of inactivity achieved its three strategic targets through its implementation.

• The system remained undetected by automated sandboxes because these systems perform analysis for short time intervals only.

• The malicious ad infrastructure became inactive before the malware activation point because of this strategy.

• The security team faces difficulties when trying to link a security breach to software installation that occurred two months ago because the software operated normally since then.

The malware activation process forced browser process termination to access password and cookie databases which used Windows DPAPI for decryption before sending stolen data to short-lived command-and-control domains. The attack shows how victims actively participate in threat delivery through supply chain-style attacks.

The Phoenix/FakeUpdate Offensive: Weaponizing Trust

MuddyWater reached its highest point of success during June 2025 when they created a trusted sender platform to break into valuable diplomatic and government organizations. The attackers obtained valid user accounts through credential stuffing and previous phishing attacks before they combined their traffic with remote work network traffic through commercial VPN services including NordVPN.

The attackers used stolen trusted accounts to send spear-phishing emails with Word documents that contained blurred content which required macro activation for protected viewing. The emails passed all SPF/DKIM/DMARC checks because they originated from actual internal or partner accounts thus successfully evading email security systems. The FakeUpdate loader infection chain performed a payload injection which deployed Phoenix v4 into system memory. The Phoenix v4 backdoor functions as an advanced tool which achieves fileless persistence through COM hijacking and uses its custom pseudo-TLV protocol over raw TCP sockets to bypass proxy and firewall detection.

The CFO/NetBird Intrusion: Ultimate Living Off the Land

1. MuddyWater displayed its advanced defensive evasion methods during an August 2025 targeted attack on a financial executive.

2. The phishing pages operated from Google's Firebase service (web.app domains) through Firebase service while using a custom CAPTCHA to stop automated scanners from accessing the pages.

3. The payload contained VBScript code which installed NetBird and OpenSSH software applications through their digital signature authentication process.

4. The script activated NetBird to establish a secure peer-to-peer network connection which bypassed all corporate firewall systems. The script established a hidden administrator account and enabled Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) functionality. The "Living off the Land" (LotL) technique allows attackers to stay connected to systems through trusted software applications which standard antivirus systems cannot identify.

Technical Arsenal: A New Generation of Malware

The 2025 malware collection from MuddyWater shows how the group has advanced its technical abilities.

Phoenix RowHammer (CVE-2025-6202)

The most dangerous technical advancement used RowHammer hardware vulnerability to attack DDR5 memory chips through this method. The RowHammer vulnerability allows physical memory access to cause adjacent row bit-flips in memory. The malware exploit bypassed built-in ECC and TRR protection mechanisms to gain root access on vulnerable systems within two minutes while also breaking RSA-2048 encryption in adjacent cloud VMs. The vulnerability requires BIOS-level fixes for mitigation which result in performance degradation.

StealthCache and BugSleep

The full-featured backdoor StealthCache uses its custom encryption system for C2 communication while implementing advanced anti-forensic features that include self-deletion and analysis tool detection. The Python-based backdoor BugSleep operates as a concealed tool which executes commands and retrieves data by using legitimate process injection methods.

Defensive Architectures and Mitigation Strategies for the New Era

The new TTPs of MuddyWater make traditional perimeter-based security systems ineffective for defense. The defense strategy requires behavioral pattern monitoring instead of using traditional perimeter security systems.

Behavioral and Anomaly Detection

RMM and LotL Tool Control: Organizations need to maintain complete records of authorized remote access and network administration tools. Any unauthorized tool execution including AnyDesk and NetBird and PDQ Connect should trigger instant high-confidence security alerts. The network should block all traffic that attempts to connect to recognized RMM command and control systems.

Organizations need to create particular security solutions which track all internal email communications to identify dangerous links and attachments sent by authorized senders.

Process Chain Monitoring: The system detects unauthorized activities through its ability to detect unexplained chrome.exe process terminations which happen before system access to Login Data or Cookies databases thus showing evidence of TamperedChef credential theft operations.

Proactive Threat Hunting

The system should actively search for sleeping agents which maintain extended periods of dormancy through their scheduled tasks and binary files and service configurations. The evaluation of Cloudflare IP range traffic patterns shows that attackers use the content delivery network to hide their C2 communication channels.

The security team needs to develop standardized patterns for RDP and SSH operations to detect unauthorized remote access tool installations and RDP enablement on non-IT administrator computers.

Vulnerability and Hardware Management

The BIOS-level configuration of high-value assets and cloud servers enables memory refresh rate optimization and TRR protection against RowHammer attacks but leads to performance degradation.

Organizations need to perform immediate patching of their internet-facing systems because the group uses vulnerabilities at a rapid pace which demands hours instead of days or weeks for patch implementation.

Conclusion: An Enduring and Evolved Threat

MuddyWater has established new operational procedures since the beginning of 2025. The group developed into a sophisticated threat organization after surviving state-on-state conflict because they gained sophisticated technical abilities and learned to be patient while operating from Iran. The group performs operations which extend past intelligence collection because it creates operational frameworks for upcoming military actions and economic sanctions.

The group operates effectively through its hardware-based attacks and psychological manipulation and its authorized tool expertise which demonstrates its commitment to stay active after any peace agreements. The global cybersecurity community needs to understand that espionage operations which occur during peaceful times now blend with activities that prepare for war. The organization stays ready at all times because upcoming operations are approaching. The security team needs to adopt the same level of certainty because they must assume that an advanced patient adversary has already entered their digital network to wait for either a timer expiration or a geopolitical event trigger.